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COMMENT
BANKS, TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT COMPANIES:
THE COMMINGLED INVESTMENT FUND
The banking industry has recently sought to take advantage of
its financial expertise by extending its investment advisory services
to the small investor-a field of diversified investment management
heretofore dominated by mutual funds.' This extension of financial
services was made possible by the Comptroller's relatively recent
revision of Regulation 9,2 which deals with the trust powers of national
banks. The revision permitted banks to operate a modified common
trust fund in essentially the same manner as an open-end investment
company-by pooling small trust accounts in a single fund, the profits
and losses of which are to be shared proportionately by each account.
Not unexpectedly, the SEC has asserted its jurisdiction over these bank-
operated funds. The SEC has taken the position that when banks
enter the mutual fund business they should provide, and be subject
to, the same investor protections which are required of mutual funds,
and that these protections are not provided by the regulations issued
by the authorities who are charged with regulating the banks.'
This Comment will examine three questions raised by the bank-
sponsored fund permitted by the revised Regulation 9. (1) Does
Regulation 9's commingled investment fund ' (CIF) qualify for both
the Securities Act exemption for bank-issued securities ' and the In-
1 "Mutual fund" is the popular name for an open-end investment company, which
offers to its stockholders diversification of investment and expert financial management
by pooling the capital of the shareholders in a large fund in which each stockholder
retains a pro-rata interest based on the amount of his contribution to the fund. Most
mutual funds are "externalized," i.e., the fund employs separate entities to supply it
with financial advice ("investment adviser") and underwriting services ("principal
underwriter"). See generally Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Pulblic Policy .Impli-
cations of Investment Company Growth, H.R. REP. No. 2237, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
45-59 (1966) ; Securities & Exchange Comm'n, Special Study of Securities Markets,
H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, 95-99 (1963).
2 12 C.F.R. § 9 (1967). Regulation 9 was promulgated about six months after
the power of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System to regulate the
trust powers of national banks was transferred to the Comptroller of the Currency.
See text accompanying notes 18-20 infra.
3 Letter From William L. Cary to Senator Robertson, Nov. 27, 1963, reprinted
in Hearings on S. 2704, Collective Investment Fuends, Before a Subcommittee of the
Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 629, 631-32 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as 1966 Hearings].
4 See note 22 infra and accompanying text.
5 Section 3(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 [hereinafter cited as Securities Act]
provides:
Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this title shall
not apply to any of the following classes of securities:
(2) [A]ny security issued or guaranteed by any national bank
48 Stat. 75 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a). For an argument that this exemption is not
grounded on sound policy considerations, see Comment, 52 VA. L. REV. 117 (1964).
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vestment Company Act exemption for common trust funds? ' (2) Does
the operation of a CIF by a bank violate provisions of the Banking
Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), prohibiting affiliation between banks
and the securities industry? ' (3) Were exemptions properly granted
by the SEC to First National City Bank of New York in order to allow
it to operate a CIF under the Investment Company Act?'
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMINGLED INVESTMENT FUND
Commingled Investment Funds have grown out of the common
trust fund, a trust device created to remedy the banking industry's
inability to administer small trusts of less than $200,000.' This
inability arose from the need to charge an excessively high fee in rela-
tion to the income produced because the expense of managing a trust
does not decrease to any significant extent with a decrease in the value
of the assets; this is particularly true for trusts with a corpus worth
less than $500,000.10 Because banks were loathe either to turn away
business or to provide an unprofitable service for established cus-
tomers," the industry developed the common trust fund. Instead of
attempting to manage each trust individually, the assets of all the
small trusts were lumped together into one "common" fund, which was
then treated for investment purposes as a single trust corpus. The
I Section 3 (c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 provides:
[N]one of the following persons is an investment company within the
meaning of this title:
(3) [A]ny common trust fund or similar fund maintained by a
bank exclusively for the collective investment and reinvestment of
moneys contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity as a trustee,
executor, administrator, or guardian ....
54 Stat. 797 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (1964).
7Section 16 of the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act) prohibits a bank
from underwriting any issue of securities or stock. 48 Stat. 184 (1933), as amended,
49 Stat. 709 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 24, para. 7 (1964). Section 20 prohibits a bank from
being affiliated with any underwriter. 48 Stat. 188 (1933), as amended, 49 Stat. 704,
707 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1964). Section 21 prohibits organizations in the securi-
ties business from accepting deposits of money subject to check or pass-book with-
drawal. 48 Stat. 189 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1964). Section 32 prohibits any person
from serving in the dual capacity of officer, director or employee of both a bank and
a firm in the securities business, unless the Board of Governors should find that an ex-
emption from this provision would not unduly influence the bank's investment policies
or advice. 48 Stat. 194 (1933), as amended, 49 Stat. 709 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 78
(1964).
8 See First Natl City Bank, SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 4538 (March 9,
1966) reprinted at 1966 Hearings 81.
91966 Hearings 83.
10 This sum was once the suggested maximum for commingling. Wolfe, Wider
Horizons for Common Trust Funds, 101 TRUSTS & ESTATES 1075, 1076 (1962). It
is also the smallest managing agency account which the First National City Bank of
New York considers it economical to accept. First Nat'l City Bank, SEC Investment
Co. Act Release No. 4538 (March 9, 1966), reprinted at 1966 Hearings 81, 83.
11 Occasionally banks would administer uneconomically small trusts for the benefit
of substantial customers of other divisions of the bank. Cf. Common Trust Funds
-Overlapping Responsibility and Conflict in Regulation, Hearing Before a Sub-
committee of the House Committee on Govenment Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
79 (1963) [hereinafter cited as 1963 Hearing].
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participants shared in the earnings and losses in proportion to their
contributions to the fund. In this way, a bank could achieve many
of the economies of scale associated with a large trust despite the
small size of each individual trust.
At the outset, the common trust fund required enabling legislation
to overcome the common law rule prohibiting a trustee from com-
mingling assets of different trusts. 2 The first common trust fund
was established in 1927,"8 but because of the financial panic which
occurred soon thereafter and tax difficulties which arose from a suc-
cessful attempt by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to assess
common trust funds with the corporate tax' 4 (later reversed by
statute "5), the growth potential of common trust funds was hampered
initially. Only recently, when the banking industry observed the
spectacular growth of mutual funds, and no doubt viewed the common
trust fund as a vehicle which would allow it to share in the success
of this rapidly expanding financial service, has the common trust
fund become a controversial financial device.
The major obstacle facing the banking industry in attempting to
enter the field was the steadfast refusal of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System (Federal Reserve Board) to permit the
use of the common trust fund device solely to provide the investor
with the bank's financial management services. This prohibition was
restated periodically in Federal Reserve Board rulings which also
emphasized the restricted nature of advertising permitted under its
Regulation F.'" The most recent of these rulings stated:
Authorization of revocable trusts for common trust fund
participation should be preceded by particularly careful deter-
mination of the bona fides of their use and purpose to avoid
improper use of the common trust fund as a medium attracting
individuals primarily seeking investment management of
their funds.'
7
The practical effect of these rulings was to prohibit banks from offering
participation in the common trust fund as a vehicle for investment.
1 2 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS § 179 (1959). Statutes permitting common
trust funds have been passed in the vast majority of states and the District of Columbia.
A compilation of state law dealing with common trust funds appears at 1963 Hearing
169-76.
13 Some common trust funds had been established to hold mortgages as invest-
ments prior to the turn of the century, but they were validated by waivers of the
common law no-commingling requirement, rather than statutory authorization. Saxon
& Miller, Common Trust Funds, 53 GEo. L.J. 994 (1965).
14 Brooklyn Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 80 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1936).
15 Internal Revenue Act of 1936, § 169, ch. 690, 49 Stat. 1708 (1936) (now INT.
REv. CODE OF 1954, § 584). A comprehensive history of Brooklyn Trust Co. and § 169
appears in Saxon & Miller, supra note 13, at 1003-09.
1642 FED. RESERVE BULL. 228 (1956); 41 Fm. RESERVE BULL. 142 (1955); 26
FED. REsERvE BULL. 390, 393 (1940).
1742 FED. RESERVE BULL. 228 (1956).
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In December, 1960, the Federal Reserve Board proposed an amend-
ment to Regulation F which forbade the use of the common trust
fund to manage revocable inter vivos trusts in which the settlor was
the income beneficiary '8 -a trust well-suited to do little more than
obtain financial management services for its beneficiary-owner. Two
years after this amendment was proposed, the banking industry sug-
gested that "a more logical distribution of supervisory authority" 1"
would be achieved by transferring the authority to regulate the trust
powers of national banks from the Federal Reserve Board to the
Comptroller of the Currency. Congress agreed.20
Soon after the enactment of this enabling legislation, the Comp-
troller convened a committee of banking industry representatives to
propose amendments to Regulation 9 (the new name for Regulation F,
adopted in its entirety by the Comptroller) which would provide for
a more "up-to-date" 21 regulation of the trust powers of national banks.
Regulation 9, as amended on April 5, 1963, divided common trust
funds into several categories, one of which, the CIF, is described as:
[A] common trust fund maintained by the bank exclusively
for the collective investment and reinvestment of monies
contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity as managing
agent ... 22
The amendment deleted the Federal Reserve Board's requirement that
the common trust fund be used only for "bona fide fiduciary pur-
38 The Federal Reserve Board proposed to add the following language to Regu-
lation F:
The funds of an inter vivos trust revocable by the settlor and providing for
the payment of the principal of the trust to the settlor's estate at his death
may not be invested in a Common Trust Fund established and maintained
under this section.
25 Fed. Reg. 12479 (1960).
19 Hearing on H.R. 12577 & H.R. 12825 Before a Subcommittee of the House
Committee on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1962) (statement of
F. A. Gunther on behalf of the American Bankers Association).
20 The authority was transferred by 76 Stat. 668 (1962), 12 U.S.C. § 92a (1964).
21 Remarks of James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, at the Midwinter
Trust Conference of the American Bankers Association, February 4, 1963, Reprinted
at 1963 Hearing 64-68.
22 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a) (3) (1967). The two other categories of common trust
funds created by the amendment are:
[A] common trust fund maintained by the bank exclusively for the collective
investment and reinvestment of monies contributed thereto by the bank in its
capacity as executor, administrator, guardian or trustee under a will or deed;
12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a) (1) (1967),
[A] fund consisting solely of assets of retirement, pension, profit-sharing,
stock bonus, or other trusts which are exempt from Federal income taxation
under the Internal Revenue Code; ....
12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a) (2) (1967). Although all three types of common trust funds are
designated "commingled investment funds" by Regulation 9, the term "CIF" is used
here to refer only to the common trust fund defined in the text.
A comprehensive discussion of the securities laws issues raised by the pension-
type fund defined above appears in Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the
Federal Securities Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 795, 819-37 (1964).
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poses." 23 This deletion caused the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
to question the applicability of the pass-through treatment accorded
common trust funds by section 584 of the Internal Revenue Code.24
After several conferences between the two agencies, the Internal Reve-
nue Service ruled that
moneys received by a bank in its capacity as managing agent
under a managing agency agreement expressly pro-
viding that such moneys are received by the bank in trust,
when placed in a common fund with other similar funds,
will be contributed to the common fund by the bank in its
capacity as "trustee" as that word is used in Section 584 of
the Code.25
A revised version of Regulation 9, published about ten months later,
added to the definition of a CIF the words, inter alia, "under a man-
aging agency agreement expressly providing that such monies are
received by the bank in trust." 26 Apparently the Comptroller did
not desire to dispute the Commissioner's contention that a managing
agency was not the trust relationship referred to in section 584.
The SEC has contended that the CIF, whether operated by
commingling trusts or managing agency accounts, is an investment
company subject to registration under the Investment Company Act,
and that the interest therein (participation) is a security subject to
212 C.F.R. §206.17(a)(3) (1961) (terminated Oct 12, 1962). Although
Comptroller Saxon had stated that "no one has ever been able to explain satisfactorily
that term [bona fide fiduciary purpose] to me," 1963 Hearing 67, its meaning was
clarified in a ruling of the Federal Reserve Board which pointed out that "trusts
created and used for bona fide fiduciary purposes are to be distinguished from trusts
created by individuals primarily seeking the benefits to be derived from corporate
fiduciary management." 41 FED. RESERvE BULL. 142 (1955). Compare the observation
by Professor Scott that trusts can be classified by "a general division into trusts
created for the purpose of distributing the bounty of the settlor, and trusts created
for business purposes," 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS, § 59, at 514 (2d ed. 1956) with the state-
ment of one of the members of the committee for revision of Regulation 9: "Now
just what is a bona fide trust? . . . No one in authority has defined it, and no
one really knows . . . ." Wolfe, Wider Horizoiw for Common Trust Funds, 101
TRUSTS & ESTATES 1075, 1076 (1962).
24 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 584(b), provides: "A common trust fund shall not
be subject to taxation under this chapter and for purposes of this chapter shall not
be considered a corporation."
2 5 Rev. Rul. 64-59, 1964-1 Cum. BULL. 194.
2629 Fed. Reg. 1719 (1964). The definition currently reads:
[A] common trust fund, maintained by the bank exclusively for the collective
investment and reinvestment of monies contributed thereto by the bank in its
capacity as managing agent under a managing agency agreement expressly
providing that such monies are received by the bank in trust ....
12 C.F.R. § 9.18(a) (3) (1967). A more complete comparison of Regulation 9 as
originally promulgated and as amended in response to Rev. Rul. 64-59 appears at
1966 Hearings 599.
The concept of a managing agent holding funds in trzst may have been sufficiently
elusive to prompt First National City Bank to request and obtain an exemption from
this requirement from the Comptroller when it proposed to operate a CIF. This
exemption had no effect upon the CIF's tax status, since it qualified for pass-through
treatment accorded mutual funds. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 851.
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registration under the Securities Act." Although the Comptroller
has disagreed vehemently,2" the issue remains unresolved by the courts.29
APPLICABILITY OF FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
The Securities Act
In arguing that the participation in the CIF need not be regis-
tered under the Securities Act, the banking industry has presented two
contentions: (1) because no certificate of participation is issued,30 the
SEC is precluded from finding the existence of a security,31 and
(2) assuming there is a security, it is exempt from registration under
the act.32 The first of these arguments finds little support in the
statute, which includes in the definition of a security "any interest or
instrument commonly known as a security." " Since "instrument" in-
cludes all written documents, it would seem that "interest" includes
unwritten obligations, assuming that statutory redundancy was not
intended. This reading of the statute finds support in both the legis-
lative history 3  and recent cases.35  In any event, the agreement be-
27 1963 Hearing 9 (statement of William L. Cary, Chairman of the SEC).
281d. at 162-64 (statement of James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency).
29 Neither agency has requested the Attorney General for a ruling. House Comm.
on Gov't Operations, Common Trust Funds: Overlapping Responsibility and Conflict
in Regulation, H.R. REP. No. 429, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1963).3 ORegulation 9 provides that:
No bank administering a collective investment fund shall issue any certificate
or other document evidencing a direct or indirect interest in such fund in any
form.
12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b) (13) (1967). Regulation F prohibited the issuance of a certificate
which was negotiable or assignable, 12 C.F.R. § 206.17(a) (3) (1961) (terminated
Oct. 12, 1962); it has been suggested that the more restrictive approach taken by
Regulation 9 was motivated by a desire to avoid the appearance of having issued a
security. Comment, Regulation of Bank-Operated Collective Investment Funds-
Judicial or Legislative Resolution of an Administrative Controversy, 73 YALE L.J.
1249, 1253 n.35 (1964).
31 See 1966 Hearings 33.
32 See note S supra.
33 Section 2(1) of the Securities Act provides:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or
subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate,
certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas,
or other mineral rights, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly
known as a "security", or any certificate or interest or participation in, tempo-
rary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1964).
34 A House Committee report states:
It is also intended to apply the act to interests commonly known as "securities"
whether or not such interests are represented by any document or not. Thus
the statute will apply to inscribed shares, and its provisions cannot be evaded
by simply refraining from issuing to the subscriber any documentary evidence
of his interest.
H.R. REP. No. 1838, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1934).
35 Roe v. United States, 287 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1961) (dictum); Woodward v.
Wright, 266 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1959); SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709 (N.D.
Tex. 1961). There is no reason why the managing agency agreement itself could not
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tween the bank and the participant falls within the term "investment
contract" " as defined by the Supreme Court:
[A]n investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act
means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person
invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third
party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the enter-
prise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal
interests in the physical assets employed in the enterprise."
The argument that the participations in the CIF are entitled to
the Securities Act exemption for securities issued by banks 3 has been
refuted in a recent article discussing the securities law problems raised
by the use of a common trust fund as a vehicle for the management of
pension plan assets.39 The article advances two arguments relevant
here: (1) the exemption extends only to securities which represent an
interest in the profits derived from the business of banking, and (2) the
definition of "issuer" which makes the bank the issuer of CIF par-
ticipations 4" could be construed as speaking "solely to the question
of who has the issuer's liability and . . . not . . . [to] the question
of whether a registration statement is required." 41 Both arguments
appear equally applicable to the CIF, precluding the availability of the
bank security exemption for the CIF participation.
serve as the written "instrument," if one were required. Furthermore, the Securities
Act nowhere requires that the "security" be retained by the holder so that failure
to provide the investor with a copy of the contractual agreement does not preclude
a finding that the managing agency agreement is itself a security.
3 6 "Investment Contract" is included in the definition of "security". See note
54 in! ra.
37 SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946). The pre-Regulation 9
common trust fund, although an investment contract, was exempted from registration
under § 4(2) of the Securities Act because sales of its participations were not made
by means of a public offering. See 1963 Hearing 4 (statement of William L. Cary,
Chairman of the SEC). Section 4(2) of the Securities Act has the effect of exempting
from registration "transactions not involving a public offering." 48 Stat. 77 (1933),
as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1964). Section 4(2) is not applicable to partici-
pations in a CIF, since Regulation 9 permits them to be sold by public offering. See
notes 49, 52, 55 infra.
-3 See note 5 supra.
89 Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability of the Federal Securities Laws to Pen-
.ron and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 795, 828-30 (1964).
40 Section 2(4) of the Securities Act provides in relevant part:
[W]ith respect to certificates of interest or shares in an unincorporated invest-
ment trust not having a board of directors (or persons performing similar
functions) or of the fixed, restricted management or unit type, the term
"issuer" means the person or persons performing the acts and assuming the
duties of depositor or manager pursuant to the provisions of the trust or other
agreement or instrument under which such securities are issued .
48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4) (1964).
411 Mundheim & Henderson, supra note 39, at 829 n.111.
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The Investment Company Act
The banking industry does not seem to contest the proposition
that the CIF is an investment company,42 but rather claims an ex-
emption from the provisions of the Investment Company Act under
section 3(c) (3), which exempts
any common trust fund or similar fund maintained by a bank
exclusively for the collective investment and reinvestment of
moneys contributed thereto by the bank in its capacity as a
trustee, executor, administrator or guardian. . .
The legislative history of this section indicates, however, that the
near-dormant common trust fund considered by the Seventy-sixth
Congress is not the CIF which Regulation 9 would permit to be
aggressively merchandised in direct competition with mutual funds.
The courts have ruled that the Investment Company Act is to be
construed on the basis of the report on Investment Trusts and Invest-
ment Companies." A supplement to this report was devoted ex-
clusively to common trust funds; " it commented on their inactivity
as follows:
Common trust funds have not participated in any active
program of advertising and solicitation for participants in
their funds. Only nine of the funds included in this survey
published general booklets describing their business and
recommending this use of the common trust fund medium.
In instances where there was any solicitation for business it
was of an informal nature where the officers of the banks or
42 Section 3(a) of the Investment Company Act defines "investment company"
as any issuer which
(1) is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to
engage primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in
securities;
(3) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, rein-
vesting, owning, holding or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to
acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the
value of such issuer's total assets (exclusive of Government securities and
cash items) on an unconsolidated basis.
54 Stat. 797 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1964).
43 54 Stat. 797 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3 (c) (3) (1964). (Emphasis
added.)
44 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. SEC, 326 F.2d 383, 387 (3d Cir. 1964).
See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). Compare
the first sentence of the Investment Company Act which states that the act was
passed "upon the basis of facts disclosed by the record and reports of the Securities and
Exchange Commission made pursuant to section 79z-4 of this title [section 30 of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935] .... " 54 Stat 789 (1940), 15
U.S.C. § 80a-l(a) (1964).
45 Commingled or Common Trust Funds Administered by Banks and Trutst
Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 476, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939).
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trust companies discussed with their clients the comparative
advantages and disadvantages of particular investment media.
[I]t appears that only a few common trust funds
have issued participations in the last two years.46
This statement should be contrasted with a recent article by a
senior vice president of a major New York bank which outlines
techniques for aggressive selling of trust services.17  He suggests
instructing all officers of the bank concerning the characteristics of
good prospects for the sale of trust services, 48 and expanding bank
mailing lists by utilizing the suggestions which these officers would
then make.49  Other merchandising techniques include exhortations
to employees to use the bank's trust services so that they might be
able to make recommendations to acquaintances based on first-hand
experience," ° and letters of commendation from high-ranking bank
officers to employees and their supervisors for having secured sub-
stantial accounts. In connection with this outline for an effective
sales campaign, it should be realized that the CIF practically obviates
the problem of selecting customers; nearly anyone with a checking
account is a good prospect.
It is unlikely that the minimal restrictions which Regulation 9
imposes on advertising51 will restrain to any significant degree the
active merchandizing of the CIF. The bank's depositors and other
customers provide a captive audience, which banks have not hesitated to
solicit by including circulars with regular statements of account and
other banking correspondence. Regulation 9's restrictions on adver-
4 6 Id. at 6.
4 7 Lovell, Trust New Business, 104 TRUSTS & ESTA ErS 1164 (1965). For a
description of a similar program, advocating the application of door-to-door selling
principles to the merchandising of trust services, see Vunderink, Contest for Trust
Blsiness, 103 TRUSTS & ESTATES 652 (1964).
48 It was suggested that this be done by means of a pamphlet, a copy of which
was appended to the article. Lovell, supra note 47, at 1169.
4 9 This practice, if used to promote the CIF, would probably constitute a public
offering.
[Tlhe transaction tends to become public when the promoters begin to bring
in a diverse group of uninformed friends, neighbors and associates.
Non Public Offering Exemption, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552 (Nov. 6, 1962).
Compare note 37 supra.
r0 Compare the excerpt from Securities Act Release No. 4552, quoted note 49
supra.
51 The sole restriction on advertising is mentioned only incidentally, in connection
with a financial disclosure requirement:
[A] full [financial] report shall be furnished upon request to any person, and
the fact of the availability of such material may be given publicity solely in
connection with the promotion of the fiduciary services of the bank. Except
as herein provided, the bank shall not advertise or publicize its collective
investment fund(s).
12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b) (5) (iv) (1967).
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tising would not prohibit including with such materials a reference to
the availability of the bank's financial report for the CIF.52
The restrictions imposed on the content of publicity concerning
the CIF do not seem to present any real impediment to a bank
which desires to promote its CIF services. Since the prohibition goes
to the advertisement of the CIF itself-"the bank shall not advertise
or publicize the collective investment fund(s)" -there appears to
be nothing to prevent banks from continuing the aggressive advertising
of their uncommingled managing agency accounts, 4 either omitting
the usual reference to minimum size, or including a squib such as "no
account too small." Indeed, on its face, the regulation does not seem
to prohibit the inclusion of the following remark:
Investors with more modest sums are invited to ask any
branch office for a copy of our CIF financial report, which
shows how even small sums can be profitably invested in
equities managed by First Bank. 5
Although the above statement might be interpreted as a solicita-
tion for the CIF in violation of the prohibition on advertising because
it may do more than merely mention the CIF financial report, a more
liberal construction may be entertained by the Comptroller. When a
member of a congressional committee asked the Comptroller how he
would rule on an advertisement which included the statement
We welcome this new opportunity the Comptroller's regu-
lation would provide for us to put our trust investment
facilities at the disposal of those of our customers with
modest funds available for investment.
he declined to commit himself."6 It seems clear that promotional
campaigns such as those outlined above would result in an investment
vehicle far different from the near-dormant trust device which Congress
exempted from the Investment Company Act.
The CIF is further distinguished from the pre-1940 common
trust fund since there no longer may be a close personal relationship
between the bank and the investor. A member of the banking industry
62 These circulars often publicize the more usual fiduciary services of the bank;
hence a reference to the CIF would not violate the prohibition on advertising. See
note 51 supra. This form of promotion would amount to a public offering under
the Securities Act, since it would constitute advertising under the statute. See note
55 infra.
53 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b) (5) (iv) (1967).
64 See, e.g., New Yorker, April 8, 1967, p.26.
55 Such a solicitation would clearly constitute a public offering: "Public adver-
tising of the offering would, of course, be incompatible with a claim of a private
offering." Non Public Offering Exemption, SEC Securities Act Release No. 4552
(Nov. 6, 1962).
561963 Hearing 49.
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has suggested that the servicing of the CIF be done on a "machine-to-
man" basis; " it is significant that Regulation 9 does not prohibit the
use of the CIF as an automated vehicle involving no contact between
bank and customer other than mailed annual statements. Lack of
such individual attention deprives the investor of the opportunity to
obtain that information about the management of his account which
assures the adequate protection of his investment interests.5s
When the Investment Company Act was passed, Regulation F
(Regulation 9's predecessor) was included in the common trust fund
supplement to the Investment Company Study."9 This regulation re-
stricted the operation of common trust funds by national banks to
those operated solely for bona fide fiduciary purposes. ° Although
it has been argued that the Regulation F restrictions on common trust
funds were not intended to be read into the Investment Company Act's
exemption for common trust funds,"' it seems unlikely that Congress
intended to exempt a fund like the CIF, which is subject to a regu-
lation which so departs from Regulation F that the fund may become
an investment vehicle of far greater financial significance than the
1940 common trust fund. 2 This would seem particularly true where
the fund could provide substantial unregulated competition for
57 Address by G. T. Lumpkin, Jr., 44th Mid-Winter Trust Conference of the
American Bankers Ass'n, Feb. 5, 1963, reprinted at 1963 Hearing 114-20.
58 A necessary element to the "close personal relationship" is a substantial invest-
ment which enables the participant to demand information which the bank might
otherwise be reluctant to collect and disclose. Consider a request by a CIF investor
for a record of loans made by the bank to firms in which the bank has invested CIF
assets-the cost of answering such queries in relation to the share of the management
fee attributable to a single participation would enable the bank to justify its refusal
to comply with the request. This would be particularly true where the size of the
CIF is such that the withdrawal of an individual participation would have a negligible
effect on the size of the bank's advisory fee.
Compare the following from a landmark case interpreting the private offering
exemption of § 4(2) of the Securities Act reproduced in note 37 supra:
[T]he applicability of § 4(1) [now § 4(2)] should turn on whether the
particular class of persons affected needs the protection of the Act. An
offering to those who are shown to be able to fend for themselves is a trans-
action "not involving any public offering."
SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 125 (1953). The employees here were not
shown to have access to the kind of information which registration would disclose.
Id. at 127.
69 H.R. Doc. No. 476, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. 27-30 (1939).
60 12 C.F.R. § 206.17(a) (3) (1961) (terminated Oct. 12, 1962). See notes 16,
17, 23 supra and accompanying text.
61 Marin, Common Trust Funds-Development and Federal Regulation, 83 BANK-
ING L.J. 565, 570 (1966).
W Compare the statement of Mr. Justice Brennan in discussing whether a variable
annuity and its underlying fund should be subject to federal securities regulation:
These controls [implemented by the Investment Company Act] may be largely
irrelevant to traditional banks and insurance companies, which Congress
clearly exempted; they were not investing heavily in equity securities and
holding out the possibilities of capital gains through fund management; but
where the investor is asked to put his money in a scheme for managing it
on an equity basis, it is evident that the Federal Act's controls become vital.
SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 65, 79-80 (1959). See generally
Comment, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 600 (1967).
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investment companies subject to the restrictions of the Investment
Company Act.3
Although the Comptroller feels that his periodic audits and regu-
latory restrictions provide protection sufficient "' to warrant the avoid-
ance of dual regulation,65 it is not clear that this supervision satisfies
the need for investor protection. The SEC maintains that standing
alone, the regulatory and supervisory efforts of the Comptroller do
not adequately protect the CIF investor because: (1) the Comptroller's
regulation does not ensure that the investor can make an informed
choice on the basis of full and adequate disclosure; " (2) the Comp-
troller's primary concern in the regulation of banks is protection of
depositors, rather than settlors and beneficiaries of trusts.67 The
first of these criticisms seems amply borne out by a study of Regula-
tion 9-neither the plan of operation nor a financial statement need
be shown to the participant unless he specifically asks for them.
68
There is no requirement that the investment objective of the CIF be
disclosed under any circumstances. The material which is disclosed
need not be arranged to facilitate comparison with the disclosure
63 Compare SEC v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 387 U.S. 202 (1967), where,
in holding a "Flexible Fund Annuity" subject to the Securities Act, the Court said
that such contracts
offer important competition to mutual funds . . . and are pitched to the
same consumer interest in growth through professionally managed investment.
Id. at 1562. The Court did not decide the question of whether an insurance company
issuing securities was subject to the provisions of the Investment Company Act
641963 Hearing 42-45. The Comptroller also argues that the local law of trusts
provides protection to the participant over and above that provided by his office.
Ibid. However, it should be noticed that many regulatory and common law protections
can be waived by the investor, see note 72 infra and accompanying text, and that
such rights as may exist afford no protection unless the investor can apprise himself
of their accrual through full and complete disclosure. Compare note 58 supra.
Further, it should be noticed that, although none have been authorized as yet,
CIF's which do not have participations in excess of $10,000 in any one account may
not be subject to any of the provisions of Regulation 9. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(c) (3)
(1967).
65It should be noticed that banks are presently subject to regulation by more
than one agency, i.e., the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and the Federal
Reserve Board. The Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board has observed that
banks engaged in more than one line of business, e.g., receiving deposits and operating
mutual funds, can expect multiagency regulation, and that such regulation is not
duplicative in any real sense. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H.R. 8499, H.R. 9410, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. 104-05 (1964).
661963 Hearing 10-11. The Chairman of the SEC also argued that Regulation 9
does not require uniformity of disclosure from year to year by the same fund. Ibid.
As to whether the Comptroller's supervision is adequate to replace the disclosure
required by federal securities legislation, the Chairman observed (in the course of
hearings on whether bank stocks should be subject to the reporting requirements of
the Securities Exchange Act) that
To say that bank regulation renders this disclosure philosophy unnecessary
is to say that bank regulation is an effective substitute for the free exercise
of an investor's judgment.
Hearings on S. 1642 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Cominittee on Banking
and Currency, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 54-55 (1963).
671963 Hearing 9.
68 12 C.F.R. §§ 9.18(b) (1), 9.18(b) (5) (iv) (1967).
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required of mutual funds, 9 with whom the CIF will compete directly
for the investor's funds.
The orientation of the Comptroller's supervision toward pro-
tection of depositors is revealed in the Comptroller's Manual for Rep-
resentatives in Trusts,"° which deals with the Comptroller's examina-
tion and audit of the trust departments of national banks. The manual
treats trustee liability in terms of the necessity for securing adequate
waivers and releases to protect the bank, rather than in terms of
compensation to injured beneficiaries (this latter subject of compen-
sation is not treated in the manual):
[Where the possibility of surcharge liability exists] valid
written approvals [of questionable investments] should be
obtained from beneficiaries with vested or contingent inter-
ests. Approval by a life tenant having a general power of
appointment over the remainder interest should afford pro-
tection for the bank, unless the power to appoint is not exer-
cised. Approval by a holder of a limited or special power of
appointment, however, does not provide adequate protection
except with respect to the power holder. Where such ap-
provals are obtained from some but not all of the beneficiaries
who have vested or contingent interests, there is no protection
gained against the possible claims of those who did not join
in the approvals.7
Hence it appears that the trust beneficiary's interest is not uppermost
in the mind of the Representative in Trusts during the course of his
examination, and no adequate substitute for the protection of federal
securities law is provided.
A further illustration of Regulation 9's failure to focus upon pro-
tection of the CIF investor occurs in the area of self-dealing. At the
outset it should be noticed that the limited protection Regulation 9 does
afford can be waived by the participant,72 and that such waivers need
69 An example of SEC disclosure requirements can be found in the prospectus
for the CIF sponsored by First National City Bank. Prospectus, Commingled Invest-
ment Account of First National City Bank (June 14, 1966).
70 This manual is reprinted in 3 CCH FED. BANKING L. REP. 59,211-337
[hereinafter cited as CCH Manual].
71 CCH Manual 59,218. (Emphasis added.)
72 Section 12 of Regulation 9 provides in part
(a) Unless lawfully authorized by the instrument creating the relationship,
or by court order or by local law, funds held by a national bank as fiduciary
shall not be invested in stock or obligations of, or property acquired from,
the bank or its directors, officers, or employees, or individuals with whom there
exists such a connection, or organizations in which there exists such an
interest, as might affect the exercise of the best judgment of the bank in
acquiring the property, or in stock or obligations of, or property acquired from,
affiliates of the bank or their directors, officers or employees.
12 C.F.R. § 9.12 (1967). (Emphasis added). Subsection (b) makes a similarly
evadable prohibition of purchases from the CIF; subsection (c) allows the bank to
include a provision in the agreement which obviates the prohibition against CIF
purchases of securities issued by the bank or its affiliates.
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not be disclosed in any way other than by inclusion in the managing
agency agreement.73 Even if the waiver were not included in the
agreement, it has been pointed out that it is still possible for the bank
to compel the CIF to retain an excessive proportion of its assets in
the form of a cash deposit with the bank, and that the CIF may be
used to shore up bank loans by causing it to purchase interests in a
borrower which are subordinated to the bank's loan.74 Although the
banking industry contends that the retention of cash balances is not
a real problem, the Comptroller's Manual for Representatives in Trusts
indicates that at least insofar as retention of deposits in the savings
department of the bank is concerned, some questions remain:
Occasionally it will be found that a bank is carrying a
substantial portion of its trust department funds as a time
deposit in the commercial department without interest for
the purpose of reducing the amount of reserve required to be
carried. This practice is permissible, but the bank is re-
quired to make a periodic analysis of the individual accounts
involved in order to determine the total amount which may
be so deposited.75
This provision seems to indicate that the bank would be free to deposit
an unnecessarily large portion of the CIF assets in its savings depart-
ment-which is exactly what the participant decided he did not want
when he placed his funds in the bank's CIF rather than a savings
account. The placement of CIF funds in a savings account also has
the effect of subjecting the participant to two fees for the management
of his funds--one is the CIF management fee and the other charge
is imputed by the differential between the bank's lending rate and its
interest rate on deposits. 7  Should the bank cause its CIF to purchase
a part of a new issue of a borrower in order to provide a cushion for
a bank loan to that issuer, it is not clear whether Regulation 9 will
have been violated.77 While it can be presumed that this problem is
covered by the "overlay of trust law," it is unlikely that this abuse
will be discovered by a CIF participant, since the bank is not required
73 A sample CIF managing agency agreement containing this type of waiver
appears at 1963 Hearing 184.
741963 Hearing 11-12 (statement of William L. Cary, Chairman of the SEC).
75 CCH Manual 1f 59,229.
76 This double charge may be illustrated by the following example:
Assume the bank has been offered a $10,000 bond returning 5 per cent annually.
If purchased for the CIF, participants would receive $450 per year ($500 minus a
management fee of 2 per cent of total assets, here $50). If the bank's savings
accounts pay 4 per cent and the bond were placed with the savings department, it
would earn $400 per year for depositors, or $100 less than the amount received by
the bank. But when CIF funds are placed in a savings account, participants are
subject to both charges, and would receive only $350 on their $10,000 investment.
77This may be a purchase from an organization "in which there exists such an
interest . . . as might affect the best judgment of the bank." See note 72 supra.
The standard is somewhat vague.
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to disclose in its annual CIF report information regarding loans to
corporations whose stock it holds through the CIF. The inadequacy
of statements of income and financial condition as CIF disclosure
devices seems clear.78
There also exists the possibility that the bank might acquire an
equity holding for the purpose of obtaining banking business.79  Al-
though Regulation 9 restricts holdings of any one issuer to ten per
cent of the market value of the fund,8" there is no 'estriction on the
fraction of the outstanding equity of any one issuer which a fund
may acquire. Hence, the larger the fund the less meaningful the
restriction becomes with regard to the bank's ability to influence
the placement of the issuer's deposit and loan business."
An additional undesirable practice which Regulation 9 permits
is the use of the fund's assets to maintain a market in the bank's stock,
or even to manipulate such a market,"2 if the latter abuse escapes the
attention of the SEC. These were time-honored practices, accom-
plished by means of the bank affiliate prior to the Glass-Steagall Act. 3
Such use of the CIF allows the bank to assist large bank shareholders
to unload a large block during a declining market by imposing the
loss on the CIF; the fund's assets can also be used to buy out an
intransigent bank shareholder at an attractive price.
78 Among the other problems of conflict of interest raised by the Chairman of
the SEC was that of allocation of brokerage commissions generated by the CIF:
The fund has brokerage business to direct. We have learned that at
present brokerage is often distributed by banks according to a formula which
rewards those brokers who keep balances in the bank or have other business
relations with the bank. This policy of the banks could lead to excessive
portfolio turnover or to the fund not receiving the maximum benefit from its
brokerage business.
1963 Hearing 12. The prospectus for the CIF established by First National City
Bank expressly treats this problem, pledging to distribute brokerage so as to maxi-
mize the benefits to the participants.
79 Compare the following testimony offered by the Chief Counsel for the study
which led to the Investment Company Act:
The investment banker may be impelled to have the investment company make
an investment, not based upon investment quality of that investment, but be-
cause the particular investment may give him an "in" to get the banking
business from the company whose securities the investment company bought.
Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 110 (1940).
80 No investment for a collective investment fund shall be made in stocks,
bonds or other obligations of any one person, firm or corporation if as a
result of such investment the total invested in stock, bonds or other obliga-
tions issued or guaranteed by such person, firm or corporation would aggre-
gate in excess of ten percent of the then market value of the fund . ...
12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b) (9) (ii) (1967). This restriction does not apply to pension CIF's,
supra note 22, probably to accommodate the tendency of pension plans to invest in the
securities of the employer.
81 The intent of the 10 per cent limitation seems to be to assure adequate diversi-
fication of the fund, rather than to prevent the use of the fund as a means of con-
trolling an issuer's placement of bank business. Compare 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b) (9) (i)
(1967) which limits to 10 per cent the fraction of any CIF (other than pension CIF's)
which may be owned by any one participant.
82 See note 72 supra.
S3 See note 96 infra.
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Thus, it would seem warranted to conclude not only that the ex-
emption provided by section 3 (c) (3) is inapplicable to the CIF, in view
of its legislative history, but also that it is undesirable on policy grounds
to rely solely on the Comptroller's regulation for the protection of
the small CIF investor. The essential similarity between the garden
variety mutual fund and the CIF indicates that if different regulatory
schemes were imposed, the more closely regulated mutual fund in-
dustry would bring pressure on the SEC or Congress to relax the
regulatory standards applicable to it so that it might compete more
effectively. 4 The result would be a gradual lowering of standards,
which is surely not in the public interest."5 This tendency would be
encouraged when, as often happens, the Comptroller views himself
primarily as a promoter for his industry, rather than its overseer.8 6
The SEC position that CIF's were subject to its jurisdiction
did not have the effect of prohibiting banks from offering the CIF
to the public-it merely meant that the CIF and the participation
therein were required to be registered pursuant to the Investment
Company Act and the Securities Act. Although the Comptroller
originally maintained that it would be impossible for banks to operate
CIF's if they were subjected to federal securities legislation,"7 First
National City Bank of New York (FNCB) felt that it could sponsor
a CIF under the added regulation of the SEC if that agency could be
persuaded to exempt the CIF from some of the provisions of the
Investment Company Act.8"
THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
The first step in registering FNCB's CIF was to ensure that opera-
tion of the CIF would not violate section 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act.
This section prohibits any person from being employed simultaneously
by a bank and an organization "primarily engaged in the issue, flotation,
84 This has been suggested as the probable result if the insurance industry were
successful in avoiding SEC regulation. Mundheim, How the United Benefit Case
May Affect the SEC's Chances in Congress, Institutional Investor, March 1967, p. 22.
85 Compare Comment, 115 U. PA. L. Rmv. 600, 616-17 (1967).
s8 Compare the following statement on the advisability of resolving the dispute
between the Comptroller and the SEC through legislation:
A consideration Congress should not overlook in deciding whether to
allow the Comptroller to regulate these funds is the close affiliation of the
Comptroller to banking interests. It may be argued that he cannot provide
objective regulation in the investors' best interests because of his natural
sympathy towards those he regulates.
Comment, 73 YALE L.J. 1249, 1264 n.123 (1964).
871963 Hearing 64-68. When the SEC indicated a willingness to exempt CIF's
from certain provisions of the Investment Company Act, see note 145 infra, the
Comptroller no longer found SEC supervision objectionable:
We contend that the regulations of our office and those of the SEC are com-
plementary and we trust that they will be modified so as to eliminate duplicate
reporting or other unnecessary activities on the part of banks while still
maintaining all necessary protections.
1966 Hearings 131.
88 For a discussion of these exemptions, see text accompanying notes 132-47 infra.
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underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail .... of
stocks, bonds or other similar securities." " It was conceivable that
officers of the bank might be deemed to be working for both the bank
and the CIF, and, further, that the sale of participations might con-
stitute the issuance, underwriting or distribution of securities. Since
the Federal Reserve Board has jurisdiction to interpret section 32,
it was necessary for FNCB to apply to the Board for a ruling that
operation of its CIF would not violate that section."' The Federal
Reserve Board took what might be deemed a formalistic view of
section 32 and construed it as prohibiting only employment by two
separate entities. Hence the Board's holding that FNCB and its CIF
were a "single entity" led to the conclusion that the prohibitions of
section 32 were not violated. 2 At the same time the Board declined
to rule 93 on the applicability of section 21 of the same act, which
forbids a firm engaged in the business of issuing a security from accept-
ing deposits. 4 The Board's reluctance was based on a policy estab-
lished in 1934, that it would not rule on statutes providing criminal
penalties.9 5
About two months after the Federal Reserve Board's ruling had
been criticized on the floor of the House of Representatives for allow-
ing banks to engage "directly" in an activity in which they could not
engage "indirectly," "I the Board released a legal memorandum ap-
89 Section 32 provides in relevant part:
No officer, director, or employee of any corporation or unincorporated
association, no partner or employee of any partnership, and no individual,
primarily engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or dis-
tribution, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, of stocks,
bonds or other similar securities, shall serve the same time as an officer,
director, or employee of any member bank ....
48 Stat. 194 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
90 The Glass-Steagall Act does not define the word "security" as does § 2(1)
of the Securities Act, supra note 33; hence it has been argued that qualification of
the CIF participation as a security under the Securities Act is not determinative of
the interpretation of the Glass-Steagall Act. Mundheim & Henderson, Applicability
of the Federal Securities Laws to Pension and Profit-Sharing Plans, 29 LAw &
CoNTvmp. PROB. 795, 824-25 (1964).
91 In applying for an interpretative ruling under § 32, rather than an exemptive
general regulation, FNCB may have been motivated by a desire to avoid conflict with
the policy of the Board of Governors prohibiting association between mutual fund
and bank personnel. See note 100 infra. However, this policy has been criticized
as being excessively restrictive in view of the regulation afforded by the Investment
Company Act, and it has been suggested that the exemptive provision in § 32 be
applied to this situation as well. Lehr, The Affiliation of Commercial Bank and
Mutual Fund Personnel, 10 ST. Louis L.J. 190 (1965).
92 The ruling is now codified. 12 C.F.R. § 218.111 (1967).
93 12 C.F.R. §218.111(k) (1967).
9448 Stat. 189 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. 378 (1964). The relevant language
of the statute is set out in the text accompanying note 117 infra.
95 20 FED. RIsERvE BuLL. 41 (1934).
96 Statement by Representative Patman, 111 COnG. Rlc. 27,211 (1965). The
reference was to the fact that § 32 prohibits interlocking directorates between banks
and securities firms and thus prevented banks from engaging in the securities business
"indirectly." To the extent that the bank and its CIF comprise a single entity, the
Board's refusal to rule on § 21 (which prohibits banks from doing securities business
"directly") validates the criticism.
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parently intended to buttress its ruling. 7  This memorandum seems
to rely upon a 1946 Supreme Court case, Board of Governors v.
Agnew,"s for the single entity concept. Agnew involved several
directors of a national bank who were also employed by Eastman
Dillon, a member of the New York Stock Exchange. The Supreme
Court upheld the Federal Reserve Board's determination that this
dual employment violated section 32. Since Eastman Dillon did less
than one-half of its business in the field of underwriting, the defendants
had contended that section 32 was inapplicable, because the phrase
"primarily engaged in . . . underwriting" " required that more than
half of the firm's business consist of the enumerated activities. The
Court held that "primarily" meant "substantially" and that Eastman
Dillon's underwriting business was substantial enough to bring the
prohibitions of section 32 into play. In the legal memorandum published
to support the FNCB ruling, the Board read Agnew for the proposition
that an "outside firm" must be involved before the statute is applicable.
It is unlikely that this reading is accurate; the Agnew opinion nowhere
relies on this principle, and it never discusses the question of when a
firm is sufficiently "outside" to constitute a separate entity subject to
the act's prohibitions.
The single entity concept "0 0 does not provide much analytical
assistance in determining whether bank sponsorship of the CIF creates
conflicts of interest similar to those which section 32 was designed to
eliminate. The exemptive provision of section 32 makes it clear that
these conflicts of interest involved the effect which dual employment
might have on the impartiality of the bank's investment advice, both
for clients and its own portfolio:
In limited classes of cases . . . the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System may allow . . . [dual employ-
97 The memorandum is reprinted at 1966 Hearings 581-88.
98329 U.S. 441 (1947).
99 See note 89 supra.
100 The single entity concept appears to have originated in rulings by the Federal
Reserve Board that a bank director could not be affiliated with an adviser to a mutual
fund, if there was such a close connection between the adviser and either the fund
itself or its principal underwriter that they constituted a single entity. See, e.g., 12
C.F.R. § 218.107 (1967). The concept's most recent application prior to the FNCB
ruling occurred in a case in which a partner in a New York Stock Exchange firm
desired to become a bank director. Before he applied to the Board for a ruling on
whether his connection with the securities business disqualified him, the partner had
obtained an exemption from the exchange rule requiring partners to have an interest
in partnership subsidiaries proportionate to their interest in the partnership. Without
the exemption from the exchange rule, the partner would have been required to own
an interest in the partnership's underwriting subsidiary, which conducted business
proscribed by § 32; ownership of this interest would clearly have prevented him from
being a bank director. (A prior ruling by the Board held that participation in the
business of executing securities transactions for the account of others, i.e., acting as
a securities broker, did not constitute activity prohibited by § 32. 12 C.F.R. § 218.1
n.1 (1967).) The Board denied the application on the ground that the partnership
and its subsidiary were a single entity, and that the partner was engaged in the pro-
hibited activity by virtue of his interest in the partnership itself. 12 C.F.R. § 218.108
(1967).
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ment] by general regulations when in the judgment of the
said Board it would not unduly influence the investment
policies of such member bank or the advice it gives its
customers regarding investments.'0 '
The single entity concept permits all bank-operated CIF's to avoid
the strictures of section 32. Such a result is clearly undesirable in
view of the abuses to which CIF's may be subjected if they also escape
SEC regulation."0 2
The 1935 amendments make it clear that section 32's scope nearly
coincides with section 10(c) of the Investment Company Act of
1940."° Section 10(c) prohibits a majority of the members of an
investment company's board of directors from being officers or di-
rectors of any one bank. A comparison of the legislative history of
section 10(c) with the text of section 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act,
set out above, illustrates their near unity of purpose."0 4 In a com-
mittee report on the Glass-Steagall Act, the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency observed that
There seems to be no doubt anywhere that a large factor
in the overdevelopment of security loans, and in the dan-
gerous use of the resources of bank depositors for the purpose
of making speculative profits and incurring the danger of
hazardous losses, has been furnished by perversions of the
national banking and State banking laws, and that, as a
result, machinery has been created which tends toward
danger in several directions.
(a) The greatest of such dangers is seen in the growth
of "bank affiliates" which devote themselves in many cases
to perilous underwriting operations, stock speculation, and
maintaining a market for the bank's own stock often largely
with the resources of the parent bank.0 5
10148 Stat. 194 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1964). (Emphasis added.)
That part of § 32 which is omitted from the quotation in the text appears at note 89
supra.
1
0 2 The exemption from § 10(c) of the Investment Company Act currently granted
to FNCB, see text accompanying note 147, infra, emphasizes the undesirability of a
categorial exclusion. Should this exemption remain in force, the Board ought to
impose § 32's prohibitions on the bank; such flexibility is not possible under the present
ruling. Such action by the Board would have the effect of requiring that the CIF
board of directors have no members who are also officers or directors of the adviser
bank.
10354 Stat. 806 (1940); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(c) (1964). The text of § 10(c)
is set out at text accompanying note 147 infra.
104 It is curious to note that § 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act (which was entitled
in part "an Act to provide for the safer and more effective use of the assets of banks,"
48 Stat. 169 (1933)) deals with investor protection, whereas the legislative history
of the Investment Company Act describes § 10(c) as providing protection for banks.
See text accompanying note 106 infra.
105 S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10 (1933).
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This concern for the strength of the banking industry and for pur-
chasers of the investment advice represented by participations in the
bank affiliate is mirrored by a statement made by the chief counsel for
the Investment Company study (which laid the foundation for the
1940 Act) who pointed out that the section 10(c) prohibition
was inserted not only on the basis of our study, but after
conferences with the Federal Reserve Board. There were
very undesirable consequences flowing from interlocking
relationships between commercial banks and investment com-
panies. Some of the worst abuses we had in the whole study
arose out of that relationship and the Federal Reserve Board,
as well as ourselves, felt that in the future, there should not
be that close relationship. The adversities of the investment
trust may have harmful effects on the bank such as runs on
the bank. They are so intimately tied up. °6
A practice made possible by the affiliation of bank and CIF which
presents the greatest dangers to depositors and a strong banking system
is that the bank may be tempted to make loans to corporations whose
stock is held in the CIF portfolio, in the hope that such loans will
improve the CIF's performance by causing a rise in the price of the
corporate borrower's stock.'0° The loan might be made in a case in
which objective judgment might dictate otherwise, and would there-
fore impose an undue risk on bank depositors for the benefit of CIF
participants. 08
The abuse of the bank-CIF relationship which is injurious to CIF
participants has three aspects, all of which have been discussed in con-
nection with Regulation 9.19 To summarize, they are (1) purchases
of voting stock for the CIF portfolio in order to acquire an influential
position with potential purchasers of bank services; (2) shoring up
bank loans by causing the CIF to purchase new issues of securities
subordinated to notes or other securities held by the bank; (3) making
a market for securities issued by the bank, including its own stock.
It should be clear from the practices described above that the
single entity concept is inappropriate for determining whether section
32 has been violated. Use of this concept amounts to a categorical
106 Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 110-11 (1940).
107 A loan may have the effect of increasing the price of a borrower's stock in
at least three ways: (1) the loan will increase the leverage of the equity, thus in-
creasing its value; (2) the loan will allow the borrower to expand, thus increasing
its profitability; (3) news of such a loan may cause investors to rely on the lender's
"obvious" confidence and bid up the stock, particularly if the lender is a large financial
institution.
105 The principal abuse of depositors' funds connected with bank affiliates was
the banks' practice of making loans directly to the affiliate to provide it with funds
with which to speculate. Although this is now prohibited by 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)
(8) (i) (1967), the practice mentioned in the text seems no less objectionable and
considerably easier to conceal.
109 See text accompanying notes 70-83 supra.
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exclusion of all bank-operated CIF's, whether or not protection against
abuse is afforded by adequate SEC regulation.
In regulating conflicts of interest in the banking industry, the
Glass-Steagall Act pursues a policy of completely separating banks
from the securities industry, thereby eliminating the possibility that
such conflicts might arise. On the other hand, the Investment Com-
pany Act of 1940 permits the existence of potential conflict-of-interest
situations, but closely regulates the conduct of persons who could become
involved in such conflicts.' The strictures of the Glass-Steagall Act
which prohibit bank-operated CIF's no longer seem necessary, in
light of the protection which the Investment Company Act provides
investors. And as has been shown, bank depositors are adequately
protected by the close scrutiny of the Comptroller of the Currency,
who has their interests uppermost in mind in regulating trust powers
of national banks."' The proper procedure for the Board of Governors
would seem to lie in the use of section 32's exemptive clause, referred
to earlier."' Reliance on the protection afforded CIF investors by
the Investment Company Act (obviously not known to the Seventy-
third Congress which passed the Glass-Steagall Act) may justify an
exemption for CIF's registered as investment companies with the SEC.
The propriety of such an exemption finds support in the language
of section 10(c) of the Investment Company Act: in contrast with
section 32's complete prohibition, section 10(c) expressly recognizes
the acceptability of dual employment, provided that it is restricted to
a minority of the investment company's board of directors."' The
implication is clear that the scrutiny of an independent majority should
be sufficient to ensure that the bank will not be "unduly influenced," as
that phrase is used in the exemptive clause of section 32.
Because the Federal Reserve Board had ruled that operation of
a CIF by FNCB did not violate section 32, the Department of Justice
declined to take any action, 1 4 on the grounds that the Board's ruling
110 A discussion of the difference between the policy of the Glass-Steagall Act
and that of the Investment Company Act appears in Lehr, The Affiliation of Com-
mercial Bank and Mutual Fund Personnel, 10 ST. Louis L.J. 190, 199-211 (1965).
111 See notes 70, 71 supra and accompanying text. The following quotation from
the Comptroller's Manual for Representatives in Trusts further demonstrates that
the Comptroller views his responsibilities in administering trust powers of national
banks primarily in the light of depositor protection:
The fundamental objective of a trust department examination is the assur-
ance that the fiduciary activities of a National Bank are being executed in
compliance with applicable Federal and local law and Regulation 9. When
a National Bank trust department is thus operated, the beneficiaries and other
parties at interest in the accounts being administered will have no just cause
for complaint, and the bank will not be liable for surcharge. Therefore, the
protection of the interests of the beneficiaries and other parties at interest is
essential to the protection of the bank's depositors and shareholders.
CCH Manual f 59,211.
112 See notes 100-01 mpra and accompanying text
31354 Stat. 806 (1940), 15 U. S. C. §80a-10(c) (1964). Section 10(c) is set
out in relevant part in the text accompanying note 147 infra.
114 Letter From Fred M. Vinson, Assistant Attorney General, to Orval L. Du-
Bois, Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission, Jan. 24, 1966, reprinted at
1966 Hearings 588.
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would preclude a successful prosecution under section 21.115 This
position is difficult to support. Section 21 in no way depends upon
the single entity concept as it is applied by the Board. The irrelevance
of the Board's ruling on section 32 to questions arising under section
21 is emphasized by the fact that the Board had declined to rule on
section 21, expressly reserving the question of whether it had been
violated. Hence the Board's approval under section 32 should have
no weight in ascertaining whether FNCB comes within section 21's
prohibitions.
Because the Department of Justice declined to commit itself con-
cerning section 21, the question of whether any sections of the Glass-
Steagall Act (other than section 32) had been violated, remained for
private litigants to raise. In Investment Company Institute v. Camp,'1 6
the Investment Company Institute alleged, inter alia, that Regulation 9
permitted the operation of a CIF in contravention of the restrictions
laid down by sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act.
Section 21 prohibits any organization engaged in the business of
"issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at wholesale or retail,
or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes
or other securities" from also accepting deposits of money.ll 7 In com-
parison, section 32 prohibits any person employed by a bank from
accepting additional employment with a firm which is primarily engaged
"in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at
wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds,
or other similar securities .. 118 It is clear that the activity de-
scribed in section 21 very closely parallels that described in section
32.119 The Federal Reserve Board has ruled that when an open-end
investment company
is issuing or offering its redeemable stock for sale, it is
"primarily engaged in the issue . . .public sale, or distribu-
tion, . . . of securities" and that section 32 of the Banking
Act of 1933 [the Glass-Steagall Act], as amended, prohibits
an officer, director or employee of any such company from
serving at the same time as an officer, director or employee
of any member bank.12
11548 Stat. 189 (1933), as amended, 12 U. S. C. §378 (1964). The relevant
portion of § 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act is set out in the text accompanying note 117
infra.
116 Civil No. 1083-66 (D.D.C. 1966). (No opinion has been handed down as of
Sept. 25, 1967.)
11748 Stat 189 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §378 (1964).
11s48 Stat. 194 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
119 Both FNCB and the Comptroller argue that the activities described in § 21
are identical to those described in § 32. See 1966 Hearings 489-90; Memorandum of
Points and Authorities for Defendant, p. 26, Investment Co. Institute v. Camp, Civil
No. 1083-66, D.D.C. 1966.
120 12 C.F.R. § 218.101 (1967). (Brackets in original.)
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In view of the similarity of the two sections, the above ruling indicates
that a bank operating a CIF engages in the activity proscribed by
section 21. Both FNCB 121 and the Comptroller 122 argued that the
activities enumerated above describe the functions of an investment
banker, and are limited in application to the underwriting business.
Even assuming this to be true, the fact that participations represent
an exercise of the bank's fiduciary powers and are not sold at a mark-up
does not necessarily imply that sale of the participation does not involve
underwriting. Pointing to the fact that participations in the CIF
are sold at net asset value with no underwriting charge, FNCB argued
that the absence of a "profit" implies that the bank is not engaged
in underwriting.1 3  The lack of a mark-up notwithstanding, an in-
direct profit is derived from public distributions to the extent that
they result in an increased management fee. Inasmuch as it is the
management fee which spurs the bank to distribute CIF participations,
it can hardly be argued that the bank derives no "profit" from its
distributive activities.
Nor can the bank escape section 21's prohibitions by cloaking
its merchandising activities in the form of a trust. Although section
21 may not have been intended to circumscribe banks' trust activity,124
it seems clear that it would prohibit the sale of participations in bank
affiliates. It can scarcely be argued that section 21 would not be
applicable if the affiliate were established in the form of a trust. In
fact, as long as the CIF is susceptible to the same abuses as were
imposed upon bank affiliates,'25 the form in which the sponsor chooses
to cast the investment vehicle should be irrelevant to the application
of section 21.
The preceeding analysis also leads to the conclusion that bank
sponsorship of a CIF violates section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act,
which provides in part that a national banking association "shall not
underwrite any issue of securities or stock . . 1.26
Bank-sponsored CIF's can also run afoul of section 20 of the
Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibits a bank from being affiliated with
any organization which is
engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public
sale, or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate
participation of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other
securities .... "'
121 1966 Hearings 490.
122Memorandum of Points and Authorities for Defendant, p. 26, Investment Co.
Institute v. Camp, Civil No. 1083-66, D.D.C. 1966.
1231966 Hearings 490-91.
124See Memorandum of Points and Authorities for Defendant, p. 26, Investment
Co. Institute v. Camp, Civil No. 1083-66, D.D.C. 1966.
These abuses are discussed in the text accompanying note 73 upra.
12648 Stat. 184 (1933), as amended, 12 U.S.C. §24, para. 7 (1964).
12748 Stat 188 (1933), 12 U.S.C. §377 (1964).
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However, the application of section 20 is restricted to cases where the
bank is associated with an underwriting firm described by section 2(b)
of the act. Such association occurs only when a bank controls the
election of a majority of the CIF directors or if a majority of the CIF
directors are directors of the bank.1 28  Since section 10(c) of the
Investment Company Act prohibits a majority of the board from
being affiliated with any one bank,129 and section 16(a) requires that
directors be elected by the stockholders, 3 ' conforming with section
10(c) of the Investment Company Act would preclude CIF's from
violating section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act.
THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT EXEMPTIONS
Having secured the permission of the Federal Reserve Board to
operate its CIF-entitled "Commingled Investment Account" '41 -the
last hurdle for FNCB to overcome was registration of the CIF with
the SEC. The bank requested exemptions from several sections of
the Investment Company Act designed to ensure that an investment
company is not dominated by a bank or an investment banker. 2 The
exemptions which were contested subsequently before both the SEC ...
128 Section 2(b) defines "affiliate" as including any corporation, business trust,
association, or other similar organization-
(1) Of which a member bank, directly or indirectly, owns or controls
either a majority of the voting shares or more than 50 per centum of the
number of shares voted for the election of its directors, trustees, or other
persons exercising similar functions at the preceding election, or controls in
any manner the election of a majority of its directors, trustees, or other per-
sons exercising similar functions; or
(2) Of which control is held, directly or indirectly, through stock owner-
ship or in any other manner, by the shareholders of a member bank who own
or control either a majority of the shares of such bank or more than 50 per
centum of the number of shares voted for the election of directors of such bank
at the preceding election, or by trustees for the benefit of the shareholders
of any such bank; or
(3) Of which a majority of its directors, trustees, or other persons exer-
cising similar functions are directors of any one member bank.
48 Stat. 162 (1933), 12 U.S.C. § 221a(b) (1964). Notice that subsection (2) would
prevent the CIF from being used to provide the bank's shareholders with a vehicle
for stock speculation as was done with bank affiliates prior to 1933. This abuse
simply involved a bank loan to the affiliate which would use the proceeds to purchase
highly speculative securities. Since only the loan would appear on the bank's financial
statement, the nature of the bank's portfolio was effectively kept secret from depositors.
The simultaneous ownership described in subsection (2), supra, assured that it was
bank shareholders who reaped the speculative profits while the corporate form of
the affiliate resulted in depositors' sharing the losses if the affiliate failed. See Willis,
The Banking Act of 1933 in Operation, 35 COLUm. L. REV. 697, 701 (1935).
129 Relevant parts of § 10(c) are set out in the text accompanying note 147 infra.
130 54 Stat 813 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-16(a) (1964).
131 As of February 28, 1967, First National City Bank's "Commingled Investment
Account" had total net assets of $4,579,643.86; the value of a unit of participation
was $10.80, up 8 per cent since June 2, 1966. Semi-Annual Report of the Six Months
Ended February 28, 1967, Commingled Investment Account of First National City
Bank. A minimum investment of $10,000 is required. Prospectus, Commingled
Investment Account of First National City Bank (June 14, 1966).
132 The application for the exemptive order is reprinted at 1966 Hearings 180-86.
333 The briefs and statements filed with the SEC in connection with the litigation
are reprinted at 1966 Hearings 187-579. The opinion of the Commission, Investment
Company Act Release No. 4538 (March 9, 1966), is reprinted at 1966 Hearings 81-90.
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and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 34 related to
section 10 of the Investment Company Act' 35 which regulates the
affiliation of directors of investment companies with other businesses.
In requesting an exemption from section 10(b) (3),1"6 which
prohibits a majority of the board 137 from being affiliated with the
investment banking business, the bank pointed out that it might be
considered an investment banker since it underwrote certain issues of
government agencies."s However, the bank argued that section 17 139
of the Investment Company Act would prohibit the sale of these secu-
rities by FNCB to the Commingled Investment Account, and hence
no investor protection would be lost if section 10(b) (3) were not
applied to the directors of the CIF. The SEC agreed with this
argument.
The bank also sought to take advantage of section 10(d)'s' 4 o
lenient approach to affiliations between advisers and underwriters,
and the investment companies which they sponsor. This section elim-
inates both the section 10(a) '' requirement that no more than sixty
per cent of the board of the investment company may be affiliated
with the investment adviser, as well as the section 10(b) (2) "4 re-
quirement that a majority of the board of directors of the investment
company may not be employed by the principal underwriter. How-
'34National Ass'n of Sec. Dealers v. SEC, Civil No. 20,164, D.C. Cir. 1966.
(Argument was heard on Jan. 4, 1967, but no opinion has been handed down as of
Sept. 25, 1967.)
13554 Stat. 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80a-10 (1964). FNCB also requested ex-
emptions from other, non-controversial sections (normally granted to investment
companies in the process of organization) in order to allow it to conduct operations
until it could hold the required CIF stockholders' meeting to approve certain of its
actions. Other exemptions based on the obvious financial responsibility of the bank
were also requested; both groups of exemptions were granted. First Nat'l City
Bank, SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 4538 (March 9, 1966), reprinted at
1966 Hearings 81-90.
13654 Stat. 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b) (3) (1964).
137 Because the Commingled Investment Account has not been incorporated, tech-
nically it has no board of directors. However, the bank has established a "Committee"
charged with the functions usually performed by the board of directors of an invest-
ment company. In view of the act's definition of director, the members of the com-
mittee are subject to the restrictions placed upon directors by the act:
"Director" means any director of a corporation or any person performing
similar functions with respect to any organization, whether incorporated or
unincorporated ...
54 Stat. 790 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(12) (1964).
138 Section 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act, prohibiting underwriting by banks, supra
note 118, contains exceptions for securities issued by certain government agencies.
FNCB stressed the fact that these securities are considered suitable for unlimited
investment by national banks. 1966 Hearings 211-12. The bank implied that the
underwritten securities were not of the speculative character which, if sold to the
CIF, might endanger the fund.
139 54 Stat. 815 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1964). Regulation 9 makes a similar
prohibition, but it is sufficiently qualified so as to make it considerably less rigorous
than § 17 of the Investment Company Act. See notes 72, 82 supra.
140 54 Stat. 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(d) (1964).
14154 Stat. 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(a) (1964).
14254 Stat. 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80a-10(b) (2) (1964).
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ever, section 10(d) imposes several conditions upon those who seek
its benefits: at least one director must remain independent; no sales
charge may be imposed upon purchases of interests in the fund; the
fund must be open-end; a number of other requirements normally
satisfied by funds operated merely as an adjunct to the investment
advisory business must also be met.1 43  Applied to FNCB, section
10(d) would have permitted four of the five CIF directors to be bank
employees, rather than the maximum of three allowed by section 10 (a).
In order to avail itself of the benefits of section 10(d), FNCB re-
quested an exemption from section 10(d) (2)'s requirement that the
advisor be registered with the SEC. The bank argued that its in-
ability to comply with this provision was a "mere technicality" arising
from the fact that banks are excluded from the definition of registrable
investment advisors in the Investment Advisors Act.'" The SEC
did not agree that this inability was a technicality which should be
ignored and refused to grant the exemption, finding it not "necessary
or appropriate in the public interest." 14 This ruling seems correct
in light of the fact that the permissive approach taken by section 10 (d)
was undoubtedly predicated on the fact that a bank could not qualify
for it. Although section 10(d) relaxes requirements found both in
sections 10(a) and 10(b)(2), it pointedly ignores section 10(c),
which prohibits a majority of the board of an investment company
from being officers or directors of any one bank.146 Failure to relax
section 10(c)'s requirements can mean only that section 10(d) was
not intended to be available to banks.
The crucial provision in the Investment Company Act from which
FNCB sought an exemption was section 10(c), which requires that
no registered investment company shall have a majority of
its board of directors consisting of persons who are officers
or directors of any one bank.14
If imposed, section 10(c) would limit to two the number of FNCB
officers or directors who could serve as members of the five-man board
of the Commingled Investment Account. An exemption from section
10(c) leaves the composition of the board of directors to the section
10 (a) requirement that no more than sixty per cent-here three direc-
tors-may be affiliated with the bank.
The request for the exemption was justified on three grounds:
(1) the CIF was not the type of investment company which section
10(c) was intended to reach; (2) operation of the CIF did not violate
143E.g., 54 Stat. 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(b) (6) (1964).
14454 Stat. 847 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(11) (1964).
1451966 Hearings 87.
146 54 Stat. 806 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-10(c) (1964).
147 Ibid.
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the Glass-Steagall Act; (3) conflicts of interest were adequately regu-
lated by the Comptroller's supervision. 48 These contentions can be
evaluated only in the light of the provisions and legislative history of
section 6(c) of the Investment Company Act, 49 from which the SEC
derives its power to permit noncompliance with the act. Although a
former chairman of the SEC has stated that this provision is suffi-
ciently broad to enable the SEC to exempt the Commingled Invest-
ment Account entirely, 150 it is clear from the legislative history that
this power must be exercised judiciously and only under specified
circumstances.
According to testimony introduced in the Senate Hearings on the
bill which subsequently became the Investment Company Act, section
6(c) was incorporated into the act because
if some company came along-a company of a type which
none of us has heard about-which in fairness ought not to
be subject to this statute, we would not be able to do a
single thing for it. I think it would be very unfortunate if
the industry were made subject to too rigid a statute .... :51
The general counsel of the Investment Company study which
led to the act, David Shenker, viewed the section in these terms:
148 In applying for the § 10(c) exemption, FNCB may have been motivated by
the thought that a majority of the board must be affiliated with the bank in order
to comply with the "single entity" analysis, see text accompanying notes 91-92 supra,
or by a requirement under Regulation 9 that the bank must have "exclusive manage-
ment" of the fund. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(b)(12) (1967). These justifications do not
seem well grounded. The ruling by the Federal Reserve Board, supra note 92, does
not expressly require that a majority of the board of the CIF must be affiliated with
the bank; it merely notes that "at least one member of the committee would be
entirely independent of the bank ....... " 12 C.F.R. §218.111(e) (1967). The
ruling nowhere relies on the fact that a majority of the board must be affiliated.
It seems unlikely that the requirement that the fund be maintained by the, bank
would not be satisfied if the bank provides advisory and underwriting services in
addition to a minority of the directors of the CIF. Clearly the CIF has no vitality
without the bank's assistance. Even if the language of Regulation 9 quoted above
implies the necessity for majority control, 12 C.F.R. § 9.18(c) (5) (1967), allows
the Comptroller to establish exemptions in cases where he deems it desirable to do
so. Since any requirement for majority control arises from the Comptroller's regu-
lation, it is preferable that the Comptroller exercise his exemptive power, rather
than cause the SEC to grant an exemption from a Congressional Act. This analysis
is supported by the consideration that depositors lose no protection when the board
is independent, whereas CIF investors lose the substantial safeguard of scrutiny by
an independent board if the bank retains majority control.
149 Section 6(c) provides
The Commission, by rules and regulations upon its own motion, or by order
upon application, may conditionally or unconditionally exempt any person,
security, or transaction,.or any class or classes of persons, securities, or trans-
actions, from any provision or provisions of this subtitle or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, if and to the extent that such exemption is necessary
or appropriate in the public interest and consistent with the protection of
investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions of
this title.
54 Stat. 800 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §80a-6(c) (1964).
15o 1963 Hearing 23 (statement of William L. Cary).
151 Hearings on S. 3580 Before the Subcomn. on Securities and Exchange of the
Senate Committee on Banking and Clirrency, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 872-73 (1940)
[hereinafter cited as 1940 Hearings].
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The only thing that this provision says is-if conditions exist
or arise which manifestly are not within the legislative intent
of this legislation, then the Commission should be in a
position to exempt those in that situation, and the industry
should not be required to go to Congress to get a statutory
enactment to meet that specific situation.'52
The Senate Report viewed section 6(c) in essentially the same terms-
allowing the exemption to be applied only to persons "who are not
within the intent of the proposed legislation . . . . 15 This history
indicates that to come under section 6(c) a company must be an
investment vehicle not known to the 76th Congress nor intended to
be subject to the statute.' 4 Judged by either of these standards,
FNCB's CIF does not qualify for exemption from section 10(c).
In granting the exemption from section 10(c), the SEC argues
that the CIF is a wholly new form of investment vehicle which could
not have existed until 1963.' It is not clear, however, that the CIF
is distinguishable from the bank affiliate of the pre-1933 era. Both
CIF's and bank affiliates represent large pools of liquid assets invested
in accordance with advice supplied by their bank-sponsors. The abuses
to which the CIF is subject have been described above; ... the imposi-
tion of these abuses on bank affiliates is thoroughly chronicled in
hearings and reports which led to the Glass-Steagall Act and the
Investment Company Act.157  The abuses common to both include
shoring up bank loans through fund purchases of subordinated securi-
ties of the borrower I' and investment in potential customers in order
to garner banking business, 5 as well as various questionable transac-
tions in the sponsor's stock. When the SEC seeks to rely on Regula-
tion 9's prohibition of these practices in granting an exemption from
section 10(c),' it overlooks the fact that the prohibition may be
1521940 Hearings 197.
153 S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 13 (1940).
154 The SEC has stated the purpose of the section in terms which in practice may
have the same meaning:
[T]he propriety of granting the relief which is sought largely depends upon
the purposes of the section from which an exemption is requested, the evils
against which it is directed, and the end which it seeks to accomplish.
Transit Inv. Corp., 28 S.E.C. 10, 15-16 (1948).
1551966 Hearings 85. Regulation 9 was revised in 1963 to permit banks to
operate a CIF. See notes 22-23 supra and accompanying text.
155 See text accompanying notes 72-83 supra.
157 See, e.g., note 105 supra.
158 Securities & Exchange Comm., Report on the Study of Investment Trusts &
Investment Companies, H.R. Doc. No. 707, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 94 (1939). See
note 74 supra and accompanying text.
159 See Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 110 (1940). See note 79
mtpra.
160 First Natl City Bank, SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 4538 (March 9,
1966) reprinted at 1966 Hearings 81, 86.
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rendered nugatory by local law or provisions in the managing agency
agreement. 6"
The SEC's reliance on section 17 of the Investment Company
Act 162 also seems unjustified. Congress was apparently unwilling to
rely solely on section 17 to remedy these abuses, or section 10(c)
would not have been incorporated into the act. Indeed, it is not
unlikely that the problem of detection was the primary motive for
including section 10(c) in the act:
It has been urged that the prohibition against self-dealing
which is contained in section 17, makes the prohibition of
interlocking directors, contained in section 10, unnecessary;
but the prohibition against self-dealing is not self-executing,
and the history of American corporate finance plainly demon-
strates that such prohibitions are very difficult to enforce.
63
This difficulty, it was asserted, arises from the fact that
we have had prohibitions against self-dealing in corporation
laws for generations, and self-dealing has gone on. It is very
hard to stop it . . . because it is very easy to conceal.
164
The testimony reproduced above indicates that Congress was unwilling
to rely solely on administrative supervision to prevent self-dealing;
an exemption predicated on SEC and Comptroller overseering func-
tions would seem to subvert the intent of Congress as set out in
section 10(c) .165
While both FNCB and the SEC stress the fact that most bank
affiliates known to Congress in 1940 were of the closed-end variety,
161 See note 72 supra.
16254 Stat. 815 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17 (1964). Section 17 prohibits the
following: most sales of securities by the underwriter to the fund absent specific
approval by the SEC; joint enterprises between the fund and the underwriter; the
acceptance of a commission for selling property to the fund by a person affiliated with
the fund; the inclusion of provisions in company documents exculpating persons
affiliated with the fund for acts done in bad faith.
-1 1940 Hearings 779 (testimony of E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.).
3. 1940 Hearings 762.
165 Of course, any argument seeking to find an expression of Congressional intent
prohibiting an exemption in the language of the exempted section must meet the
argument that
"purposes fairly intended by the policy and provisions" of the Act obviously
means something more than a literal reading only of the provision from which
an exception is desired. Otherwise, the existence of a provision prohibiting
a transaction, which in every case under Section 6(c) is the very reason why
an application for exemption is necessary, would also be the very reason for
denying the application, thus making it impossible to resort to Section 6(c)
to exempt a transaction from any provision of the Act.
Transit Inv. Corp., 28 S.E.C. 10, 17 n.20 (1948). This argument seems inapplicable
where a section of the act is relied upon to show that Congress was unwilling to
depend upon the same protections against self-dealing which the SEC finds adequate.
Were the SEC to find, for example, that the problems involving self-dealing were
nonexistent, the Transit argument would refute any contention that Congress desired
that no exemption be granted simply because § 10(c) expressed a policy of prohibiting
bank domination of mutual funds.
BANK-SPONSORED MUTUAL FUNDS
this fact does not distinguish them from the CIF. The closed-end
characteristic was an historical accident in the sense that in 1940 most
investment companies were closed-end; the potentialities of the open-
end fund simply had not been fully recognized by the financial world.
Shoring up bank loans, maintaining a market in the bank's stock and
investments designed to gain bank customers, seem no less difficult
to impose upon a CIF which redeems its shares than upon a bank
affiliate which does not; it is significant that the language of section
10(c) is in no way limited to closed-end funds.
If section 10(c) is not applied to the Commingled Investment
Account, three of the five directors will be FNCB employees. It
seems clear that the unaffiliated directors who comprise only a minority
of the board exercise little or no influence on the conduct of the ad-
viser to the fund.1"6 This impotence is no doubt caused in part by the
fact that the majority controlling the board is often careful to select
as independent directors only those persons who will not be overly
critical.167  The ineffectiveness of unaffiliated directors is further ag-
gravated by the minority's dependence on majority nomination to
retain its position on the board. 6s If section 10(c) is applied to the
166 Securities and Exchange Coin'nn, Public Policy Implications of Investment
Company Growth, ILR. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 130-31 (1966) [herein-
after cited as SEC Mutual Fund Report], points out the inability of independent
directors to reduce mutual fund management fees. However, ensuring the integrity
of CIF operation by requiring adherence to generally recognized standards of fair
dealing is to be distinguished from correction of an industry-wide failure to negotiate
advisory fees at arm's-length. The failure of the independent directors in the area
of management fees arises in part from the lack of a suitable alternative if the adviser
declines to lower its fee:
The possibility of disrupting the fund's operations, the prospect of a
bitter and expensive proxy contest, and the risk and uncertainty involved in
replacing the entire fund management organization with a new and untested
one, make termination of the existing advisory relationship a wholly un-
realistic alternative in negotiations over advisory fees.
SEC Mutual Fund Report 131. Such a limitation is not present when the CIF board
desires to require restitution of funds unfairly diverted to the bank-adviser; if threats
do not succeed, the courts are open to a lawsuit demanding repayment.
167 [I]f you are choosing an unaffiliated director or an independent director
you are not going to choose anybody who is going to be too hard on you.
You are going to tend to pick a friend of yours; . . . I have encountered two
situations where a so-called unaffiliated or independent director happened to
be the son of the leading stockholder of the adviser.
University of Pennsylvania Law School Conference on Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L.
REv. 669, 739 (1967) (remarks of Abraham L. Pomerantz).
168 Who picks the unaffiliated directors? The affiliated men pick the un-
affiliated men. The men who need to be watched pick the watchdogs to watch
them.
Ibid. Section 15(c) of the Investment Company Act, 54 Stat. 813 (1940), 15 U.S.C.
§80(a)-15(c) (1964) requires that a majority of the unaffiliated directors approve
the management fee contract. The addition of one more independent director to the
five-man Commingled Investment Account does not change the number necessary to
approve the contract-two unaffiliated directors' votes are still needed. However,
a majority of the board is normally necessary for the nomination of a slate of directors,
and it is the control of this function which appears to be particularly necessary to
ensure the independent supervisory judgment contemplated by § 10(c) of the Invest-
ment Company Act. Although the initial selection of unaffiliated directors will be
made by the bank, their working independence coupled with possible liability for
overlooking bank transgressions should soon overcome any bias toward acquaintances
in the bank as long as a majority of the board is independent
1967]
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Commingled Investment Account, only two directors will be bank
directors or officers; however, the difference in result is not merely
that one more director will be independent of the bank. Rather,
an independent board is more likely to ensure that the CIF's invest-
ment advice is not colored by the bank's self-interest. Portfolio trans-
actions will be subject to closer scrutiny and directors are more likely
to ask probing questions regarding bank dealings when a majority
of the board is not beholden to the bank for its position.169 Trans-
actions which otherwise might go unchallenged because of a board
member's reluctance to appear as an officious gadfly, would no doubt
trigger requests for the kind of disclosure required to conduct a
mutual fund properly.
The real effect of an independent board is that the bank will be
reluctant to enter into a transaction which it may have to explain
later. It is this hesitancy, more than fear of board reprisals, that
will ultimately protect CIF participants. As long as the CIF board is
bank-dominated, the bank probably has no fear of embarrasing inquiries.
In view of the infrequency with which investment companies
change advisers without the adviser's consent,' the only thing which
banks would lose by the creation of an independent board would be
the opportunity to engage in transactions raising questions of conflict
of interest. It seems unlikely that banks would find this loss
objectionable.
Instead of continuing its campaign to obtain legislative exemption
from SEC regulation,' 7 ' the banking industry might expend its lobbying
efforts more judiciously by seeking Congressional amendment to the
Glass-Steagall Act so that the operation of CIF's is expressly exempted
from the prohibitions of sections 16 and 21,"7 provided that the SEC
retains the regulatory scheme here outlined.
169 An unaffiliated director's request for information concerning bank transactions
with issuers whose securities are held in the CIF portfolio would no doubt result in
compliance. Compare the situation of the small CIF investor requesting the same
information sketched in note 58 supra.
In connection with the need for effective disclosure in order to perform their
supervisory functions, consider the suggestion that the unaffiliated directors should
decide whether
in light of the many areas of conflicting interest between the fund and its
adviser and underwriter or affiliated broker, the unaffiliated directors may
consider it worthwhile for the fund to hire (either full-time or for special
occasions) certified public accountants and counsel who are free at all times
to represent only the interests of the fund.
Mundheim, Some Thoughts on the Duties and Responsibilities of Unaffiliated Directors
of Mutual Funds, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1058 (1967). See also id. at 1071 n.32.
170 The SEC Mutual Fund Report at 127 indicates that on those rare occasions
when a fund changes advisers, it is usually through sale of control by the adviser.
171 The most recent attempt was the introduction of S. 2704, the bill which led
to the 1966 Hearings. This bill would have amended federal securities legislation
to exempt bank-operated CIF's from the Investment Company Act, substituting regu-
lation by the Comptroller of the Currency. It is reprinted at 1966 Hearings 2-19.
-172For the argument that operation of a CIF violates these two sections, see
notes 89-109, 114-30 and accompanying text supra.
